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Abstract 
We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation 
may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may 
either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection.
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1. Introduction 
Industry cases show that there has been an increase in the number of collaborative ventures 
among firms in recent decades (Mowery 1988). One such activity is licensing of technology. 
Grindley and Teece (1997) point to the increasing use of licensing by firms such as IBM, 
Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments and AT&T. Arora et al. (2001) provide a 
comprehensive list on the size and sectoral composition of licensing.    
However, licensing has not been adequately considered in the literature on patent 
design (see, e.g. Gilbert and Shapiro 1990, Klemperer 1990, and Gallini 1992). Hence, the 
patent policies prescribed in the existing literature may not be appropriate in industries where 
technology licensing is commonly observed. The present paper is a step to fill this gap.1  
We consider two patent regimes: (i) weak patent protection, where knowledge 
spillover creates competition in the product market, and (ii) strong patent protection, where 
knowledge spillover does not occur, thus making the innovator a monopolist. We show that 
strong patent protection may not be the equilibrium outcome if licensing is an option. This 
result has an important implication for competition policy. It suggests that if firms have the 
option to increase profits through licensing, the government should not design the patent 
policy in a way that discourages licensing. Strong patent protection may dampen the 
incentive for licensing by preventing imitation. This, in turn, has a negative impact on 
welfare. Thus, licensing (compared with no licensing) induces weaker patent protection.   
More interestingly, we also show that the presence of transaction costs in licensing 
may encourage a government to increase the strength of patent protection compared to a 
situation with no licensing. Because of transaction costs, firms may not engage in licensing 
under a weak patent regime, since the gain from licensing may be outweighed by its cost. 
Hence, a weak patent regime prevents society from capturing the benefit of licensing. To get 
around the problem, the government needs to strengthen patent protection. 
 
2. Patent Regimes without Licensing 
Consider an economy with an innovator, called firm 1 and an imitator, called firm 2. Firm 1 
spends I to invent a technology corresponding to the marginal cost of production cˆ , which is 
normalized to 0. We consider two types of patent regimes: (i) strong patent regime, and (ii) 
weak patent regime. The main difference between the two regimes is that under a strong 
patent regime, imitation is not feasible and firm 1 is a monopolist, while imitation occurs 
under a weak patent regime and the firms compete as Cournot duopolists. The marginal cost 
of the imitator under a weak patent protection is c > 0, and it decreases with a weakening of 
the degree of patent protection. 
We consider the following game. In stage 1, the government selects the degree of 
patent protection, denoted by c that maximizes welfare of the economy, which is the sum of 
net industry profit and consumer surplus. In stage 2, firm 1 decides whether to innovate or 
not. In stage 3, firm 2 decides whether to imitate or not. In stage 4, production takes place and 
the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction. 
The inverse market demand function is 
 1P q= −  (1) 
where P is price and q is the total output. 
 
                                                     
1 Gallini and Winter (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Kultti and Takalo (1998) and Mukherjee (2005) examine 
the effects of licensing on R&D but ignore the issue of patent protection. Mukherjee and Pennings (2004) 
consider the implications of imitation and licensing on patent protection but focus on technology adoption. 
Mukherjee (2006) shows whether patent protection increases innovation in the presence of licensing. However, 
it does not consider optimal patent policy.  
 2
2.1. Strong patents 
Under this regime, firm 1 is a monopolist and its net profit is , 11 4
s nl Iπ = − . In order to ensure 
that a monopolist has the incentive for innovation, we assume that 14I < . If this assumption is 
violated, firm 1 has no incentive to innovate irrespective of the patent regime. Under strong 
patent, welfare of the economy is 
 , 3 .
8
s nlW I= −    (2) 
 
2.2. Weak patents 
Under this regime, the profits of firms 1 and 2 are 
2 2(1 ) (1 2 ), ,
1 29 9 and 
c cw nl w nlIπ π+ −= − = . Note that 
the patent system is called weak if it creates effective competition in the product market, 
which occurs if 0.5c < . Welfare under a weak patent is 
 
2 2 2
, 2(1 ) 2(1 2 ) (2 )
18
w nl c c cW I+ + − + −= − . (3) 
Now determine the optimal patent policy. Let Ic  be the degree of weak patent 
protection that makes firm 1 indifferent between innovating and not innovating. Hence, 
2(1 ) 9Ic I+ =
 
and firm 1 innovates if Ic c> . Since 14I < , Ic exists and lies between 0 and 0.5 
whenever 19I > .  In particular, when 1 19 4I< < , Ic is given by  
 3 1Ic I= − . 
It follows from (3) that ,w nlW  is convex in c for [0,0.5]c∈ . Further, , ,w nl s nlW W=  at c = 0.5, 
, ,w nl s nlW W>  at c = 0, and the minimum value of ,w nlW  is lower than ,s nlW . Hence, there 
exists a *c c=  such that (i) , ,s nl w nlW W=  at *c , (ii) , ,s nl w nlW W<  for *[0, )c c∈ , and (iii) 
, ,s nl w nlW W>  for *( ,0.5]c c∈ . This is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Welfare without Licensing 
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Proposition 1: (a) If 19I < , welfare maximizes at c = 0 (no protection). 
(b) If 
* 2(1 )1
9 9( , )
cI +∈ , welfare maximizes at Ic c= (weak protection).  
(c) If 
* 2(1 ) 1
9 4( , )
cI +∈ , welfare maximizes at 0.5c ≥  (strong protection). 
Proof: (a) If 19I < , firm 1 innovates even with no patent protection. Since , ,w nl s nlW W>  at c = 0, 
the optimal value of c is 0 in this situation. 
(b) If 
* 2(1 )1
9 9( , )
cI +∈ , then *0 Ic c< < . Hence, welfare maximizes at Ic c= , since , ,s nl w nlW W<  for 
*[0, )c c∈ . 
(c) If 
* 2(1 ) 1
9 4( , )
cI +∈ , then *Ic c> . Hence, welfare maximizes at 0.5c ≥  ■ 
 
3. Patent Regimes with Licensing 
Now extend the above analysis with licensing. Under licensing, firm 1 makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to firm 2 consisting of a fixed-fee F and a royalty rate r. Firm 2’s effective 
marginal cost under licensing is r, since licensing reduces its production cost to 0. We assume 
that licensing involves a transaction cost of K. As discussed in Teece (1976) and Arora et al. 
(2001), the source of such costs is the cost of writing contracts, the cost of enforcement, etc.  
In this section, the timeline is the same as in the previous section for stages 1, 2 and 3. 
However, in stage 4, firm 1 decides whether to license its technology. If firm 1 offers a 
licensing contract, firm 2 accepts the offer if licensing does not make firm 2 worse off 
compared with no licensing. Finally, in stage 5, production takes place and the profits are 
realized. We solve the game through backward induction.  
 
3.1. Strong patents 
Under strong patent, firm 1 is a monopolist without licensing and has no incentive to license 
its technology. Therefore, the profits and welfare are similar to that of subsection 2.1. 
 
3.2. Weak patents 
Under weak patent, the profits of firms 1 and 2 are 
2 2(1 ) (1 2 ), ,
1 29 9 and 
c cw nl w nlIπ π+ −= − =  under no 
licensing, while the respective profits are 
2 2(1 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 ), ,
1 29 3 9 and 
r r r rw l w lF I Fπ π+ − −= + + − = −  
under licensing. We assume for simplicity that the entire transaction cost is incurred by firm 1. 
However, this assumption does not matter, since firm 1 can adjust the fixed fee that firm 2 pays. It 
must also be noted that licensing occurs if neither firm 1 nor firm 2 is worse off under licensing 
compared to no licensing. 
It can be shown that the optimal royalty rate is *r c=  and the optimal fixed fee is 
* 0F = . The equilibrium net profits of the firms under licensing are 
2 2(1 ) 3 (1 2 ) (1 2 ), ,
1 29 9 and 
c c c cw l w lI Kπ π+ + − −= − − = .  
The above discussion assumes that licensing is profitable, which occurs if it increases 
the industry profit compared with no licensing. Licensing is profitable if 
 (1 2 )
3
c c K− > . (4) 
 The left hand side of (4) is concave in c for [0,0.5]c∈  and is maximized at 124 . Let 1c  and 2c  
be the values of c  that equate the two sides of (4). Hence, for 124[0, ]K ∈ , licensing is not 
profitable for 1[0, )c c∈  and 2( ,0.5]c c∈ , while it is profitable for 1 2[ , ]c c c∈ .  
If licensing is profitable, i.e., if condition (4) holds, welfare is 
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2 2 2
, 2(1 ) 2(1 2 ) 6 (1 2 ) (2 )
18
w l c c c c cW I K+ + − + − + −= − − . (5) 
Now we analyze the change in the welfare function due to licensing. Note that ,w lW  is 
negatively sloped and concave in c for [0,0.5]c∈ , , , ,w l w nl s nlW K W W+ = =  at c = 0.5 and
, , ,w l w nl s nlW K W W+ = >  at c = 0.  
First, consider the case of 0K = . In this case, note from (4) that if licensing is an 
option, firm 1 licenses its technology for (0,0.5)c∈ . Further, if K = 0, , ,w l w nlW W>  for 
(0,0.5)c∈ . Hence, if K = 0 and licensing is an option, a strong patent regime is never 
optimal.  In contrast, it follows from Proposition 1(c) that without the option to license, a 
strong regime is optimal for 
* 2(1 ) 1
9 4( , )
cI +∈ .  
Next, consider the case of 0K > . For a given 0K > , Figure 2 shows the profits of 
firm 1 and welfare for different values of c. 
 
 
Figure 2: Profit of firm 1 and welfare with and without licensing 
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the gross profit of firm 1 (which includes the cost of 
innovation) and the lower panel of Figure 2 shows welfare for different values of c. The curve 
AB is the profit of firm 1 without licensing and the curve ACPDB is the profit of firm 1 with 
licensing. Notice that licensing occurs for 1 2[ , ]c c c∈ . 
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In the lower panel of Figure 2, the curves SF, EHMF and EHGLMF depict ,s nlW , 
,w nlW  and ,w lW  respectively. Since licensing does not occur under the weak patent regime for 
1[0, )c c∈  and 2( ,0.5]c c∈ , we obtain , ,w nl w lW W=  in these situations. 
Now consider 1I  as the cost of innovation in Figure 2. Under no licensing, the optimal 
regime must be strong (c = 0.5). However, under licensing, the equilibrium patent protection 
is 1
Ic ′ , which implies that licensing reduces the strength of patent protection in this situation. 
Next, consider the case where the cost of innovation is 2I . In this situation, the 
equilibrium patent protection under no licensing corresponds to 2
Ic . However, in the presence 
of licensing, since licensing occurs for 1 2[ , ]c c c∈ , the optimal patent protection is 1c c= , 
since such a policy maximizes welfare (given by point G) subject to the constraint that firm 1 
innovates and licenses its technology. Therefore, licensing increases the strength of patent 
protection if the cost of innovation is 2I . This result is presented in the proposition below. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) If licensing is costless, strong patent protection is not the equilibrium 
outcome in the presence of licensing. 
(b) If there is a positive cost of licensing, licensing may increase or reduce the strength of 
patent protection, depending on the cost of innovation. For a given positive cost of licensing, 
licensing increases the strength of patent protection if the cost of innovation is such that the 
optimal level of patent protection under no licensing is less than *c  and licensing does not 
occur at the optimal level of patent protection under no licensing. However, if the cost of 
innovation is such that licensing occurs at the level of patent protection that is optimal under 
no licensing, licensing reduces the strength of patent protection.   
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